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The structure of public expenditure has become one of the chief 
recent preoccupations of both policy makers and academic commentators. 
For many years, public expenditure management was conducted very large-
ly in terms of functional programmes across the United Kingdom rather 
than of the territorial distribution between England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. This pattern was reflected in the lack of com-
prehensive data about public expenditure in the four nations. But in 
the late 1970s, under the influence of the devolution debate, a trend 
emerged towards a somewhat more territorial focus. With increasing 
public interest in the territorial attribution of public expenditure, 
better quality data have become available, showing how the existence 
of data is an important element in the framing of public issues. At 
the same time, the mechanism for expenditure allocation has taken on 
a more territorial focus. The purpose of this article is to gather 
together the available data about aggregate public expenditure in 
Scotland and to relate it to the recent developments in the political 
control and evaluation of the patterns that it reveals. 
I The Evidence 
Comprehensive analysis of identifiable public expenditure in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is possible only since around 
1960, when the new Public Expenditure Survey system started to pro-
vide accurate financial year details about the programmes of the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland governments; it was not until 
1963/64, and the establishment of the Welsh Office, that Welsh ex-
penditure was properly separated from English. Before that, interest 
in the fiscal implications of 'Home Rule all round' had led to the 
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production of returns of expenditure in Scotland and Ireland from 
1891 to 1922, and in Scotland between 1932 and 1935. A similar cal-
culation was produced for 1952-53 in response to a recommendation of 
the Catto Committee on Scottish Financial and Trade Statistics. These 
data are incomplete as they cover central government services only 
(less than three-quarters of total public expenditure in 1953) and 
do not apportion 'general services' like defence between nations, even 
though these were a dominant part of the British total at the time 
(51 per cent in 1935 and 61 per cent in 1953). They do show, however, 
that identifiable public expenditure per head in Scotland was 109 per 
cent of that in England in 1934-5, and 114 per cent in 1952-3(
1
). The 
phenomenon of higher Scottish expenditure seems to be a long-term and 
perhaps intensifying one. It is also important to note that until the 
1960s such expenditure data were conceived as the debit side of a no-
tional Scottish budget, to be compared with revenue raised in Scot-
land; this tradition was continued in the Scottish Budget for 1967-8 
produced by the Treasury, but now seems to have been abandoned be-
cause of inadequacies of data and the delicate status of oil revenues. 
Rather, the debate has shifted to the question of entitlement to pub-
lic services and of the tackling of 'needs' on a United Kingdom basis, 
irrespective of the revenue yield from each area. For the past twenty 
years, data covering all public expenditure - central and local gover~ 
ment and public corporations - becomes available. 
In research for the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution in 
the late 1960s, David King attempted to provide a consistent time-
series for the years 1960-61 to 1969-70. These are reproduced in 
table 1, using the now-usual indicator of public expenditure per head 
as an index number, with the United Kingdom as 100. As the first off-
icial Treasury calculations are for 1972-73, there is a gap of two 
years in the series, which has been filled by calculation from pub-
lished sources for the four nations using King's method. 
King faced a number of problems in his calculations, but the 
pattern he revealed is clear. The Treasury continued to decline to 
attribute some major areas of public expenditure - defence, debt 
interest and overseas representation - within the United Kingdom, 
and King had also to exclude some other categories - agricultural 
support, nationalised industries' capital expenditure, some trans-
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TABLE 1 IDENTIFIABLE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN SCOTLAND, 
ENGLA"'D, WALES A"'D NORTHERN IRELAND 1960-1980 
Per head: United 





































































































Sources: 1960-70: David N. King, Financial and Economic Aspects 
of Regionalism and Separatism (Commission on the Constitution Re-
search Paper 10 London: HMSO 1973), Table 22 
1970-72: calculated fro~ Scottish Abstract of Statistics (1976) 
Tables 178 and 181, Digest of Welsh Stat~ 22 (1976) Table 7.03, 
National Income and Expenditure 1964-74 p.l30-34 using King's method; 
expenditure on agricultural support, research councils and national-
ised industries (except energy) excluded. 
1972-74: House of Commons Hansard 24 November 1977 Vol 939 col 851 
written answer 
1974-75: House of Commons Hansard 26 November 1976 Vol 974 col 510 
written answer 
1975-76: House of Commons Hansard 26 March 1981 Vol 1 cols 417-
424 written answer 
1976-81: House of Commons l~ansard 8 December 1981 Vol 14 cols 385-
396 written answer (total expenditure on programmes) 
100 
port subsidies and research councils - through lack of comparable 
( 2 ) Th" d . . 1 d . data . 1s ten s 1n part1cu ar to epress the f1gures for North-
ern Ireland, where agricultural support - the only major identifiable 
expenditure incurred there by the United Kingdom rather than the 
Northern Ireland government - is high. With these provisos, it is 
evident from table 1 that in the early 1960s Scotland's public expen-
diture per head was 10 to 15 per cent above the United Kingdom aver-
age, accelerating to over 20 per cent by the end of the decade. Wales 
had an initial lead comparable to Scotland's but failed to share in 
the late 1960s acceleration. Northern Ireland, near the average at 
first, rose sharply to Scotland's level from 1967 onwards. England, 
as the major component of the total, was necessarily near the average 
but drifted down relative to the other nations. 
Supporting evidence for this process comes from the Treasury 
Needs Assessment Study report, published in 1979, which examined the 
six main programmes intended for devolution. This picks out Scotland's 
late 1960s spurt (from 111 per cent of the English level in 1965-66 
to 134 per cent in 1968-69)and Northern Ireland's increase from a low 
base (88 per cent in 1959-60 to 111 per cent in 1972-73)( 3 ). These 
trends can now be identified, but they were not necessarily planned 
at the time. As the study noted, 'these variations have occurred not 
only in the total allocations ..•• but also in those in a number of the 
main individual services. No systematic record exists of the reasons 
for these relationships ..•• <4 >. 
Particularly interesting is Scotland's peak of expenditure in the 
late 1960s, from which it subsequently retreated: index numbers of 
112 in 1966-67, 118 in 1967-68, 126 in 1969-70 but 117 in 1970-71. 
The Treasury Study, covering a narrower range mainly of social ser-
vices shows that this appears to reflect a disproportionate benefit 
to Scotland from the industrial development and housing policies of 
the 1964-70 Labour Government. Between 1966-67 and 1968-69, Scotland's 
industrial expenditure (principally regional development grants) in-
creased by 323 per cent against the United Kingdom total of 222 per 
cent, its housing expenditure by 45 per cent against 8 per cent( 5 ). 
These expenditures then fell back under the 1970 Conservative Govern-
mPnt, although part of Scotland's lead was retained. Two themes stand 
revealed: Scotland's ability to gain from the changing mix of British 
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public policies, and the underlying upward trend in Scotland's re-
lative expenditure level. 
From 1972-73 the methodology for attributing public expenditure 
is on surer ground, with the first comprehensive Treasury calcula-
tions, which cover difficult areas like government lending to nation-
alised industries and expenditure by United Kingdom departments in 
Northern Ireland. The 1972-73 data validate the pattern in the King 
series of Northern Ireland first, Scotland second, Wales third and 
England fourth (table 1). The first two years of Treasury figures 
are less good than later ones (principally because they exclude 
finance for the British Steel Corporation) and are not broken down 
by function: but from 1974-75 such a breakdown is available, with 
a comparable series now published covering 1976-77 to 1980-81, al-
though the extent to which expenditure can be identified is warned 
to be variable from year to year and between countries. These data 
still lack a regular publication outlet and are made public through 
ad hoc parliamentary written answers that may escape public attention. 
The detailed attributions by nation also suffer from considerable re-
trospective amendment, and the per capita data should not be regarded 
as precisely accurate. 
The table 1 figures reveal the stability of Scotland's public 
ezpenditure per head during the 1970s - between 1970-71 and 1980-81, 
it stood at between 117 and 121 per cent of the United Kingdom aver-
age, except for the 127 per cent in 1972-73, which was an untypical 
fluctuation. This contrasts with the greater variability of Wales, 
which is about 10 per cent above the average in most years, and the 
growth in Northern Ireland's level since Westminster became pre-
occupied with the province in 1968, a continuous growth checked only 
in 1979-80. Remarkably, since 1977-78, identifiable public expendi-
ture per head in Northern Ireland has been half as much again as in 
England. In a startling development in 1980-81, Welsh per capita ex-
penditure increased from 111 per cent to 125 per cent of the United 
Kingdom level, overtaking Scotland. This is almost wholly accounted 
for by the increase in government lending to nationalised industries 
(especially British Steel): if this is excluded, the figures are 119 
per cent (Scotland) and 108 per cent (Wales), against 121 and 106 in 
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become more apparent in 1981-82: Treasury Select Committee estimates 
show that the Welsh Office public expenditure programme increased by 
2.9 per cent in real terms in 1981-82 whereas Scottish Office's de-
clined by 2.6 per cent( 6 l. 
Data such as these are among the most enticing 'league tables' 
in current political debate, especially during the devolution issue, 
when the construction of defensible mechanisms for territorial ex-
penditure allocation became a pressing matter. The basic thrust of 
the data cannot be denied, but further analysis requires more care-
ful attention to the way that the figures are built up and the limit-
ations of their compilation. 
Table 2 explores the disaggregation of United Kingdom public ex-
penditure for 1980-81, the latest available year. It shows that, of 
total expenditure of over £98 billion, 15 per cent, or £15 billion, 
is not attributed by nation; this is principally the defence budget . 
Of the rest, £62 billion is spent in England, £8~ billion in Scot-
land, £5 billion in Wales and £3 billion in Northern Ireland. Terri-
torially relevant public expenditure in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland is therefore only 17 per cent of the United Kingdom total; 
many changes of substantial importance to the three nations are con-
sequently of little impact on the total. 
Additionally, within the Scottish total, only 61 per cent is 
controlled by the Secretary of State for Scotland (the principal ex-
clusions being social security and some industrial expenditure, which 
are administered by Great Britain departments). Over half of the Sec-
retary of State's programme is incurred by local authorities, and 
much of the rest by other public agencies like Health Boards. Public 
expenditure in Scotland is not a monolithic block, and its construc-
tion and control are complex processes • 
Within each nation, the largest programmes are not necessarily 
the greatest sources of variation. The largest of the 14 functional 
public expenditure programmes is social security - 24 per cent of 
the total in Scotland (table 2). But, with uniformity of organisa-
tion and entitlement, per capita provision relative to the United 
Kingdom average ranges only from 4 per cent below (Scotland) to 9 
per cent above (Northern Ireland); the rankings reflect age and 
workforce structure as well as the impact of recession. The biggest 
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national leads are in the smaller programmes, and particularly strik-
ing in Northern Ireland's lead in industry (~~ times the average), 
agriculture (4 times) and law and order (3 times), and Wales' in in-
dustry (nearly twice). England's levels and stabilised by its domin-
ance of the total, but noteworthy is its low agriculture expenditure 
(a reflection of a small farming sector) and, most significantly, low 
industrial expenditure, consistently 20 per cent below the United 
Kingdom and little more than half of Scotland's. 
For Scotland, the most impressive characteristic is the consis-
tent expenditure advantage in three of the major social programmes 
health, education and housing, which in 1980-81 were respectively 
19 per cent, 22 per cent and 40 per cent above the United Kingdom 
per capita average (table 2, column 3). This characteristic is shared 
with Northern Ireland but not with Wales. Other programme advantages 
are even more marked, but perhaps less significant in policy terms. 
'Other environmental services' expenditure (39 per cent above) is 
influenced by the inclusion of water services in rate fund expendi-
ture in Scotland but not elsewhere; agriculture (48 per cent above) 
and transport (42 per cent above) reflect the geography and economic 
structure; and industry (55 per cent above) is well below the level 
of Northern Ireland and Wales despite Scotland's concentration of de-
clining industry. But, although the explanations may differ, Scot-
land records expenditure advantages on all the main programme areas 
except law and order. 
The danger in these calculations that misleading results may 
arise in any one year makes evidence over time particularly valuable. 
Table 3 gives Scottish expenditure levels by programme for the six 
years 1975-81. This shows that, while the total has remained stable, 
some of the components have not. The most variant elements are in-
dustry and agriculture (increasing in the mid 1970s and consistently 
high) and housing and transport (increasing towards the end of the 
decade), along with the three residual and fluctuating programmes of 
nationalised industry lending, other public services and common ser-
vices. The result has been a general overall stability latterly 
buoyed up by housing and transport. 
The use of index numbers tends to conceal the fact that increas-
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of expenditure. In the 1960s, total public expenditure was rising, 
very markedly in some social programmes, and the debate was about 
the allocation of the increment. In the 1970's climate of stable or 
declining aggregate totals, territorial trends basically reflect re-
lative success in protecting national programmes against cuts. In 
fact, between 1975-76 and 1979-1980, Scottish Office's other environ-
mental services programme fell in real terms by 11.1 per cent, hous-
ing by 11.1 per cent, education by 5.2 per cent and transport by 
2.6 per cent - but in all these programmes Scotland's relative posi-
tion improved over the period(
7 l.. Cuts elsewhere were more severe, 
and Scotland's position was more than adequately protected. Total 
public expenditure in Scotland declined in real terms from 1976 to 
1979, and rose by only about 6 per cent between 1974 and 1980 de-
spite more than doubling in current pounds terms (table 3). More re-
cent analysis on this basis is inhibited by the move to cash plann-
ing of public expenditure. 
Moreover, this stability of real expenditure conceals ·shifts in 
expenditure by spending authority. Table 4 shows that expenditure 
within the Secretary of State's responsibility declined by 4.1 per 
cent in constant price terms between 1975-6 and 1980-1, but that the 
local authority element fell by 14.3 per cent while central govern-
ment's increased by 15.4 per cent. In 1975-6 the Scottish Office 
programme was 38.7 per cent central government, 57.6 per cent local 
government and 3.7 per cent public corporations (the Scottish-based 
corporations like the South of Scotland Electricity Board and the 
Scottish Transport Group); in 1980-81 the split was 46.6-51.2-2.2. 
\ 
Central government is increasing its share for two reasons: the 
fastest-expanding areas like industry and agriculture are central 
responsibilities and, within contracting sectors like housing and 
education, it is central government expenditure like housing subsi-
dies and further education that is most protected. This trend scarce-
ly amounts to an attack on local expenditure, as COSLA and others 
have suggested, because of the primacy of functional considerations 
which make local authority education, housing and environmental ser-
vices almost inevitable instruments for delivering cuts. But it does 
reveal the changing salience of the various types of expenditure 
that go to make up the aggregate total. 
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II The Meaning of 'Excess' Expenditure 
The evaluation of the 'headline' figure of identifiable public 
expenditure per head is less simple than it first appears. But, even 
after allowance is made for the limitations of the indicator as a key 
to the analysis of public expenditure, a more fundamental critique of 
it remains. Part of this critique is technical. Firstly, problems 
surround the 20 per cent of expenditure (defence, overseas represen-
tation and debt interest) that has never been attributed by nation on 
the basis that it is 'incurred on behalf of the United Kingdom as a 
whole'. This neglects the fact that, although as public goods their 
value is collective, much of these expenditures are disbursed in par-
ticular locations - armed forces' pay, defence equipment purchases, 
debt interest on particular projects. Although the Catto Committee 
argued that 'an analysis of defence expenditure which would debit 
to Scotland the cost of maintaining the naval base at Scapa Flow •.• 
would in our view be meaningless', the question is far from clear, 
particularly whether 'debit' or 'credit' is the appropriate con-
cept(8). Short's estimates on regional defence expenditure {on a per 
capita index, averaging the years 1974/75-1977/78) show a regional 
range from 50 (Yorkshire) to 205 (South West). Scotland, with below 
average defence employment, stands at 80, and Northern Ireland at 
101, but Wales, lacking both personnel and contracts, is only 51( 9 ). 
The premise of the Treasury calculations is that gain from an expen-
diture is to be identified with its location; this may be question-
able, but it is illogical to deny it in some programmes but not 
others, when attribution is equally possible. 
Secondly, the use of per capita figures as a benchmark, while 
it is a simple way to standardise for the varying population sizes 
of the four nations, is an inadequate measure of the effect of popu-
lation characteristics on public expenditure. A concentration of 
young, old or economically inactive people will make a heavy demand 
on public services, and some form of weighted population indicator as 
employed by the Needs Assessment Study is necessary to make realistic 
comparisons. 
A third problem is that the figures for Northern Ireland, which 
have attracted so much interest, are suspect because of the uneven 
attributability of expenditure. Northern Ireland has a demarcated 
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system in which virtually all identifiable expenditure is controlled 
by its Secretary of State; the separation is less clear-cut for 
Scotland and Wales. The result is that much of the minority of non-
identifiable expenditure in programmes like industry and transport 
is likely to fall within Great Britain rather than Northern Ireland; 
the present method of calculation exaggerates Northern Ireland's 
lead. It has been calculated that the true lead over Great Britain 
programmes is 30 per cent rather than 50 per cent, against which 
Scotland's 20 per cent looks relatively more favourable(lO). 
A final technical reservation is the way that the four nations 
of the United Kingdom are treated as equivalent despite their enormous 
disparity in size. This makes sense in terms of the public expenditure 
decision-making process, but it ignores the considerable variations 
that must exist between the English regions. Analysis of public em-
ployment - where data is more readily disaggregable - reveals wider 
variations among the English regions that the four nations, with on-
ly the Northern Region outranking Scotland for public sector jobs( 11 ~ 
John Short has attempted to overcome these limitations of off-
icial data by making an ambitious analysis of public expenditure in 
the three nations and the eight standard English regions between 1969 
and 1977. As well as disaggregating the English total, Short goes be-
yond the official data by attributing the location of the production 
of all inputs to public sector services even if these are for collec-
tive national benefit: this is made possible by using Ministry of 
Defence data on the location of defence establishments and a variety 
of proxy measures of consumption patterns to allocate subsidies. The 
result is an estimate of total expenditure 'in' each region covering 
over 98 per cent of United Kingdom total expenditure on programmes as 
well as one of 'regionally relevant' or 'for' expenditure covering 80 
per cent of the total and comparable to the official series. In addi-
tion, Short has produced estimates of the total revenue raised in 
each region. 
The data for Short's latest year, 1977-78, are summarised in 
table 5. They show that for regionally relevant expenditure the North-
ern region is the only part of England clearly above the United King-
dom average, on a par with Wales but below Scotland and Northern Ire-
land. The South East and North West lie around the average, but the 
other English regions are well below it, four of them- the South 
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west, East Anglia, and the East and West Midlands - clustered at 
about 15 per cent below. This pattern is stable over the two previous 
years. The effect of measuring total expenditure, the principal addi-
tional component of which is defence expenditure, is to improve the 
position of the South West considerably, to above the average, and 
moderate the advantage of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Wales 
falls to the average, and Northern Ireland's lead is cut to 30 per 
cent. Within England, the South East and East Anglia improve their 
resource gain on this wider measure, but Yorkshire and the West Mid-
lands lose. Short's data on the revenue raised in each area show that 
the North and the South West are the only English regions with a net 
inflow of funds, and that spending in Northern Ireland is over half 
as much again as the tax yield. This mutually reinforcing evidence 
shows how much variation is subsumed in 'England' but also confirms 
that the North is the only English region to match the level of pub-
lic resource input found in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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(Farnborough: Gower, 1981) Tables 4.12, 5.12, 6.12, 8.1 
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Beyond this series of problems, the notion of 'excess• expen-
diture in some parts of the United Kingdom is, more fundamentally, an 
unsound one which confuses at least four concepts: 
1) variations in public sector structure caused by socio-
economic characteristics (industrial and demographic) and 
the public infrastructure (nationalised industries, trans-
port links, public housing stock); 
ii) cyclical variations: fluctuation in economic activity, 
and its effect on public industrial and employment policy, 
has an uneven territorial impact; 
iii) varying territorial salience of United Kingdom policies: 
although the criteria for programmes like regional indus-
trial aid, new towns and urban regeneration may claim to be 
objective and not territorially biased, they are open to 
bargaining and tend to benefit some areas more than others; 
iv) differential standards of provision conceded in some parts 
of the United Kingdom but not in others is harder to iden-
tify; examples in Scotland are four-year undergraduate 
courses, denominational education, a high level of medical 
training places, special aid to crofters, and the Scottish 
Development Agency. Bilingual provision in Wales is another 
example. 
The first three categories of variation reflect the fact that 
the presence and character of public policies varies from place to 
place; consequently, the territorial pattern of public expenditure 
will be dispersed around the United Kingdom norm. There is scope for 
bargaining and pork-barrel, especially in the definition of new poli-
cies, but the bias is not a structural one. It is only in the fourth 
category that policy inputs vary by territory, but the differential 
provision involved is typically trivial in relation to total public 
expenditure. 
Implicit in the way that the expenditure indices are usually de-
ployed is the suggestion that they reveal the compromise of the uni-
tariness of the United Kingdom and might provoke a backlash from 'un-
derprivileged' England. But it is much more plausible to regard them 
as the expression of a basically consistent and need-based approach 
to public services. The structure of public expenditure control in the 
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United Kingdom- operated by officials and resting more on managerial 
monitoring than on political pleading - makes it difficult for egre-
gious sectional advantage to be sustained. The interesting questions 
are not so much the aggregate totals as the ways that the special 
channels of advocacy open to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
used to promote particular policies and defend the disparities that 
have emerged. 
Central to the issue is the definition of 'need'. This is the 
legitimate justification for variations in expenditure, but it is not 
well operationalised as a concept and tends to be an amalgam of poli-
tical and socio-economic argument. One result of the devolution de-
bate was to force the Treasury to open the Pandora's box of the jus-
tification for spending differentials, in order that the block grant 
to the devolved administrations could be seen to be based on defen-
sible principles. The Report of ~he interdepartmental Needs Assess-
ment Study in 1979 demonstrated that much of the disparity could be 
disposed of through simple need indicators like number of school 
pupils, number of public sector houses and road mileage, but that in 
the end an increment remained for Scotland and Northern Ireland - in 
Scotland's case, a 22 per cent expenditure advantage over England in 
the six main devolved programmes in 1976-77, but only a 16 per cent 
assessed greater need(l 3 ). 
From Scotland's point of view, the relative public ignorance of 
the report was merciful, not so much because of the headline figure, 
which is liable to qualifications, but because of a pattern that em-
erged in some major social services of somewhat greater need but 
markedly greater provision in health and social work a 7 per cent 
greater need but 16 per cent greater expenditure. In housing, the 
29 per cent greater expenditure was at least justified (on a methodo-
logy and weighting somewhat unfavourable to Scotland); but this con-
trasts with Wales' historically low housing expenditure despite above 
average need, the main reason why Wales emerged as 'underprivileged' 
from the study. In the report, some disagreements between departments 
are recorded: for instance, a minority view on the weighting of mor-
bidity would have increased the Scottish relativity on health and per-
sonal social services (with England at 100) from the 107.1 adopted by 
the majority of the group to 118.0(
14 >. Treatment of variables speci-
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fie to no~ all of the nations, like bilingualism, denominational sch-
ooling and historically low levels of public sector housing rents, 
also presented difficulties. The study provided evidence of how well 
the Scottish Office had argued the case over the years for special 
provision for Scottish needs and circumstances. The methodology of the 
study must have put Scottish Office on the defensive; but in practice
the study could not provide a basis for future expenditure planning, 
as it sought to put on objective ground matters which are the subject 
of political debate and interpretation. 
III The Process of Expenditure Planning 
The debate about public expenditure levels is often a historical 
and retrospective one, but the planning process within government is 
a permanent one in which past patterns interact with government objec-
tives for the future. Once territorial differentials are revealed, 
they are a challenge to action - or at least to defensible inaction. 
Unfortunately, public expenditure planning in Scotland is particularly 
impenetrable, because on top of the Whitehall PESC system are bilater-
al interactions between the Treasury and Scottish Office Finance Di-
vision, which since 1971 has managed the financial business of all 
the Scottish departments. The Division has the delicate task of maxi-
mising Scotland's share of public expenditure and deflecting unwelcome 
attention from Whitehall departments about Scotland's 'more than fair 
share' position. 
In 1978 an important change occurred in the character of the bar-
gaining process between the Scottish Office and the Treasury. In place 
of the previous argument of the Scottish case programme by programme, 
with only limited scope for the Secretary of State to manipulate the 
total expenditure under his control, a mechanical formula was devised 
for determining total Scottish Office (and Welsh Office) expenditure. 
The switch to a formula system is likely to have been influenced by 
the plans for devolution under the Scotland Act, which would have in-
volved a block grant to the devolved administration without the de-
tailed referral to the Treasury on programme detail found in the past. 
The idea of the formula is to apportion changes in equivalent blocks 
of expenditure between England, Scotland and Wales on the basis of a 
fixed ratio (which is close to the relative population shares of the 
three nations) rather than by separate argument on each programme. 
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It was agreed to use an 85-10-5 per cent formula for allocating margin-
al changes between England, Scotland and Wales. Scotland's 10 per cent 
contrasts with the 12.1 per cent under the Goschen formula {ll/80ths 
of England and Wales, based on 1913-14 population); used to allocate 
Scottish education expenditure between 1918 and 1959, this also had 
considerable normative effect. 
It may be surmised that Scottish Office ministers and officials 
saw advantage in a formula system at a time of a general downwards 
trend in public expenditure and in the light of the findings emerg-
ing from the Needs Assessment Study. As Peter Rendle, the Principal 
Finance Officer, told the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs in 1980: 
'I think it was calculated that the arrangement was 
advantageous because public expenditure control was 
getting tighter and more complex and that the days of table-
thumping were ceasing to have their effect. This was the 
consideratio(l~jat was borne in mind in accepting this 
arrangement' • 
The 'days of table-thumping' were probably brought to an end by 
the weakened political position of the Scottish Office following the 
devolution referendum of March 1979, which brought an end to the pre-
occupation with devolution that had so heavily involved Whitehall in 
Scottish matters in the mid-1970s, and the election of a Conservative 
government in May 1979 not dependent upon Scottish MPs for its major-
ity. But the publication of the Needs Assessment Study in late 1979 
seemed to have little public impact, and the protection that the for-
mula gave to Scottish expenditure was enhanced once it was put on the 
public record in 1980 and discussed at the 1980 select committee meet-
ing. Subsequently the committee has taken a close interest in the for-
mula at its annual sessions on Scottish aspects of the public expendi-
ture white paper, where the Secretary of State presents it as a useful 
tool for the pursuit of Scottish priorities and the maintenance of his 
own authority in Whitehall. 
The effect of the new system is twofold. The fact that the 10 
per cent formula figure is rather less than Scotland's actual present 
share (estimated at nearly 11 per cent) moderates the impact on Scot-
land of changes in public expenditure - both increases and decreases 
are smaller than in England(l
6
). Secondly, it ties the trajectory of 
Scottish public expenditure to developments in England in services 
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land (such as education, health and housing). Within the formula 
total, the Secretary o£ State gains freedom to switch funds between 
'traditionally Scottish' programmes, though at the insistence o£ the 
Industry and Agriculture departments in Whitehall, concerned to en-
force common United Kingdom policies, these services are excluded 
from the switching 'block•. The Secretary o£ State gives up his right 
to make substantive functional arguments about his programmes, but is 
shielded £rom the full brunt o£ cuts and may protect some expendi-
ture heads at the expense o£ others. A formula conceived by the Trea-
sury to equalise territorial shares by differential growth has the 
opposite e££ect when aggregate public expenditure in the equivalent 
programmes is falling, as it has since 1979-80. Scotland would get 
less than its £air share of growth, but is presently getting less 
than its fair share of cuts. This makes the formula advantageous for 
Scotland at present, and no doubt somewhat unwelcome to the Treasury. 
In place o£ the traditional special pleading for Scotland, the 
new system rests on constant monitoring of discussion about English 
expenditure. The government's annual public expenditure white paper 
in March is the culmination of a year of planning in the Scottish 
Office, uniting general guidance from Finance Division with discuss-
ion within the functional departments. Consideration of each programme 
involves the appropriate finance Assistant Secretary, head of depart-
ment, and junior minister, followed by corporate reconciliation by 
ministers and senior officials and final decision by the Secretary of 
State. The whole process seems to be characterised by amity and give-
and-take, and the combination of separate appraisal of each programme 
and authoritative choice by the Secretary of State gives strength to 
the system. 
By autumn, debate reaches Cabinet level, co-ordinated by the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury. At this stage, dispute between the Treasury 
and the spending departments around the Cabinet table may become fierce, 
but the Scottish and Welsh secretaries must have a rather more detached 
relationship to it now that the formula system is in operation. During 
this process, Scottish Office is in a difficult position - considering 
switches within a block whose size fluctuates according to the rela-
tive success of English ministers in preserving their programmes; 
good intelligence is essential to ensure that the formula js applied 
accurately. In major spending fields like housing and education, a 
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weak English minister or one committed to cuts may have a seriously 
adverse impact on the Scottish programme; in the present government, 
Michael Heseltine and Sir Keith Joseph must have caused some fears. 
The result is that the expenditure parameters for Scotland - so import-
ant for particular public services, and the general relationship be-
tween central and local government - are determined by a procedure 
which is detached from the political debate about Scottish policies. 
The real effect of the switching power is difficult to evaluate 
because of the way that public expenditure data is published. In evi-
dence to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs in June 1982, George 
Younger said that in the 1981 PESC round he had allocated rather less 
to transport and housing and rather more to education and law and 
order than his English colleagues had done(l 7 ). Given the immobility 
of much of public expenditure, and the constraints o£ United Kingdom 
policy uniformity, it would be unrealistic to expect more than margin-
al shifts between programmes. Adjustments in priorities also seem to 
fluctuate from year to year. But the formula is more than a cosmetic 
change in procedure. The block arrangement gives real new discretion 
to the Secretary of State, and if this is not exercised to the full it 
is because his judgement on expenditure priorities is unlikely to be 
much different from that of his English colleagues. 
The new system was completed by the separation o£ Scottish and 
Welsh expenditure into territorial programmes in the 1981 public ex-
penditure white paper (Northern Ireland always having had one). 
Scottish Office was keen to achieve this so that it could consolidate 
its vote estimates (which follow the PESC programme structure) and so 
gain more flPxibility in the operation of cash limits, which cover 
half of the programme. The new programmes do not cover all public ex-
penditure in the two nations, but only the two-thirds (Scotland) and 
hal£ (Wales) controlled by the Secretaries of State; they exclude the 
main programmps planned to expand, social security and defence. The 
effect of the formula may be seen by comparing the components of these 
programmes with their English equivalents. Table 6 shows the latest 
plans in the current price terms used in the 1982 public expenditure 
white paper, and should be read in the light of the fact that on the 
government's assumptions on price movements an average cash increase 











expenditure in real terms(
18
). It is clear that cuts planned for 
land and Wales over the life of the Conservative government are less 
severe than in England, with Northern Ireland doing even 
all, the Scottish cut is marginally more severe than the Welsh, a 
contrast to the plans in the 1981 white paper, which shows that 
pattern of decisions on English programmes during 1981 has had 
severe impact on the mix of expenditure found in the Scottish nroar~-.
than on the Welsh. Within the programmes, the effect of the 
power is becoming apparent, with Wales protecting transport 
environmental services and Scotland housing. In every functional pro-
gramme apart from other environmental services 
gain expenditure relative to England. There is every chance that 
land's 20 per cent lead in public expenditure will be maintained under
a formula that effectively and ironically- protects it. 
TABLE 6 PLANNED CHANGES IN PUBLIC EXPENDITIJRE 
1979-80 to 1984-85 
% change, cash Scotland England Wales 
Agriculture +46.3 +15.8 +66.7 
Industry & Employment +65.2 +15.9 +49.3 
Transport +50.5 +49.3 +61.6 
Housing -12.0 -39.1 -38.7 
Other Environmental Servs. +32.5 +40.3 +42.2 
Law & Order +89.3 +81.5 
Education +49.7 +39.6 +50.5 
Health & Pers.Soc.Servs. +75.2 +71.4 +75.0 
--- --- ---Total (including other 












~ alaw and order (England and Wales programme) apportioned 
according to 1979-80 actual expenditure 
bexcluding social security, for comparability 
Sources: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1982-83 to 1984-85 
(London: HMSO, Cmnd 8494 March 1982) Table 2.15 (Scotland) 
2.16 (Wales), 2.17 (Northern Ireland); English expendi-
ture from equivalent components of functional programmes 
-Table 2.3 (MAFF), 2.4 (4.1), 2.6 (6.1 and 6.2), 2.7 
(total programme), 2.8 (total programme), 2.9(HO and LCD) 
2.10 (10.1), 2.11 (total programme). These are broadly but 
not precisely equivalent. 
IV Conclusion 
Data on aggregate public expenditure in Scotland is far from 
perfect, and the concepts of need and entitlement that underlie its 
analysis also lack clear definition. But there is evidence of persist-
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ing advantage that seems to involve a measure of real excess not att-
ributable to structural explanation. Essentially, this reflects the 
failure in the 1960s and 1970s to develop mechanisms for the equitable 
allocation of public expenditure within the United Kingdom. The pro-
blem is to graft a limited amount of territorial determination on to 
a basically functional system. The way the system operates causes con-
cern to the Treasury, for it tends to be territorially biased against 
England. Their strategic response has been to demarcate Scottish, 
Welsh and Northern Ireland expenditure, set parameters on its overall 
size, and then contract out detailed management to the departments in 
the three nations. The new formula - designed with devolution in mind 
- embodies this approach. But the system is neither comprehensive nor 
self-regulating: it does not cover all expenditure in the nations, 
and it has to live with an institutional imbalance whereby Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland have their advocates in Whitehall who can 
affect the design of United Kingdom policies as well as make special 
pleas. 
Scotland is continuing to benefit from this system, but the poli-
tical justification for its expenditure level is somewhat precarious. 
The excess, apparently representing an over-fulfilment of response to 
need, is a tribute to the success of Scottish Office ministers and 
officials in building on Scotland's special circumstances to enshrine 
a higher standard of public sector provision. This involves particu-
larly the protection of a distinctive institutional tradition in health 
and education, and the vigorous pursuit of housing and industrial de-
velopment policies. The traditional Scottish Office strategy might be 
described as the protection of the historical base of expenditure cou-
pled with the retention of the freedom and the means to argue for in-
cremental policies. Now,as the Secretary of State agreed at the 1980 
select committee meeting, the principle is 'what we have we hold', 
using the formula to head off the full impact of cuts at the price of 
falling behind English growth rates should public expenditure in-
crease<19>. 
The argument is reactive and defensive, concerned to protect a 
relative position and retain the national as well as partisan credi-
bility of ministers. The Scottish approach works on exceptionalism: 
its spirit is captured by the remark of a Northern Ireland cabinet 
minister about Scottish devolution that 'we do not want any more pro-
vincial calves pulling at the one cow•(
20
). Scotland has achieved 
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